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HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: JESINOSKI 




The purpose of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)1 is to enable 
consumers to make responsible financial decisions and improve 
efficient use of credit.2 TILA protects consumers by requiring that 
lenders give material disclosures concerning certain qualifying loan 
transactions.3 TILA also contains the substantive right of rescission, 
which empowers a consumer to rescind a loan for three days after the 
transaction is consummated or three days after material disclosures 
are made, whichever is later.4 However, the right expires after three 
years, even if the disclosures are not provided.5 
The crux of litigation involving rescission under TILA centers on 
what steps a borrower must take in order to properly rescind a loan.6 
Section 1635 requires that consumers notify the creditor of rescission 
in accordance with regulations promulgated by the agency 
responsible for implementing TILA.7 Regulation Z, which implements 
TILA, allows for rescission through written notice.8 Yet, the majority 
of courts have found that an additional step is required—the 
consumer must also file suit.9 
 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2016. I would like to give special 
thanks to Professor de Fontenay for her advice, support, and guidance on this Commentary.  
 1.  15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601–1667f (West 2014). 
 2.  Id. § 1601(a). 
 3.  Id. § 1635(a). 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. § 1635(f). 
 6.  See, e.g., Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 257–58 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(outlining conflicting views on how rescission is exercised). 
 7.  15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(a). 
 8.  Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a) (2013). 
 9.  Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1188 (10th Cir. 2012). 
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This Commentary explores the reasoning behind those decisions 
in addition to the arguments put forth by the Petitioners-borrowers 
(Jesinoskis) and Respondents (Lenders) in Jesinoski v. Countrywide 
Home Loans, Inc.10 Part II describes the factual background of the 
case. Part III explains the legislative origins of TILA and subsequent 
amendments that affected rescission. Part III also covers the circuit 
split that existed before the Supreme Court’s decision and discusses 
the limitations on the right of rescission, its scope, when and how it 
can be exercised, and the effect of exercising the right. Part IV 
describes the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Jesinoski and Part V 
summarizes the arguments put forth by the parties. Part VI outlines 
why the Supreme Court, in the shortest opinion of the term so far, 
correctly read § 1635 to mean what is says: rescission is exercised 
through written notice, not by filing suit. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On February 23, 2007, Larry and Cheryle Jesinoski refinanced the 
mortgage on their principal home in Minnesota.11 They obtained the 
loan from Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. in order to pay off 
consumer debt.12 Bank of America and Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc. were assigned an ownership interest in the 
loan as well.13 TILA requires lenders to give each borrower two copies 
of the Notice of Right to Cancel.14 Countrywide failed to do so, giving 
only two copies instead of four.15 TILA also requires lenders to give a 
disclosure statement to each borrower.16 Again, Countrywide failed to 
do so.17 
Exactly three years after the transaction was consummated, the 
Jesinoskis sent written notice of rescission to the Lenders by certified 
mail.18 Twenty days passed, but the Lenders took no steps to cancel 
the security interest as mandated by TILA.19 Only after three years 
 
 10.  Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 790 (2015). 
 11.  Joint Appendix at 29, Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 13-684 (U.S. 
Apr. 28, 2014) [hereinafter Joint Appendix]. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id.; see also Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a) (2013) (“[A] creditor shall deliver two 
copies of the notice of the right to rescind to each consumer entitled to rescind.”). 
 15.  Joint Appendix, supra note 11, at 29. 
 16.  15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(a) (West 2014). 
 17.  Joint Appendix, supra note 11, at 29. 
 18.  Id. at 30. 
 19.  Id.; see 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(a). 
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passed did Bank of America send a letter refusing to accept 
rescission.20 
The Jesinoskis sued the Lenders to enforce the rescission and 
obtain statutory damages. The district court ruled against them, citing 
Eighth Circuit precedent interpreting § 1635(f) to require a borrower 
to file suit within the three-year period, and the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed.21 The Jesinoskis successfully petitioned for a writ of 
certiorari from the Supreme Court.22 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Historical Context: Evolution of TILA and Its Right of Rescission 
Congress enacted TILA “to assure a meaningful disclosure of 
credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more 
readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the 
uninformed use of credit.”23 Before its passage, consumers struggled 
to shop for credit because lenders did not have a uniform way of 
calculating interest and other fees associated with the loan.24 As such, 
TILA is mainly a disclosure statute requiring that creditors provide 
“clear and accurate disclosures of terms dealing with things like 
finance charges, annual percentage rates of interest, and the 
borrower’s rights.”25 Due to its core remedial nature, TILA is 
construed liberally in favor of the consumer.26 
TILA was designed to remedy deceitful and predatory creditor 
practices on the part of lenders.27 In response to concerns of predatory 
lending, Congress sought to empower consumers with a substantive 
tool—something with “real teeth”—to protect themselves; the right of 
 
 20.  Joint Appendix, supra note 11, at 30. 
 21.  See Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 729 F.3d 1092, 1093 (8th Cir. 2013), 
(explaining that the Eight Circuit has reviewed the notice-lawsuit issue and required suit). 
 22.  See Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1935 (2014) (granting 
certiorari). 
 23.  15 U.S.C.A. § 1601 (West 2014).  
 24.  Lea Krivinskas Shepard, It’s All About the Principal: Preserving Consumers' Right of 
Rescission Under the Truth in Lending Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 171, 185 (2010). 
 25.  Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 412 (1998). 
 26.  Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1179–80 (10th Cir. 2012).  
 27.  N. C. Freed Co. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 473 F.2d 1210, 1214 (2d Cir. 
1973); 114 CONG. REC. 14,388 (1968) (“[A]nother provision of the bill is also vitally important. 
That is . . . a series of amendments . . . [seeking] to strike at home improvement racketeers who 
trick homeowners, particularly the poor, into signing contracts at exorbitant rates . . . .”) 
(remarks of Rep. Sullivan) (emphasis added). 
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rescission fit the bill.28 It is a powerful tool that polices the lending 
process through a set of highly technical rules.29 
Subsequent amendments30 generally sought to put constraints on 
the borrower’s right of rescission. In 1974, § 1635(f) was enacted to 
put a time limit on the borrower’s ability to rescind a qualifying loan, 
even if he received the proper disclosures from the lender.31 Before 
the addition of sub-section (f), § 1635 did not place a time limit on the 
right to rescind for those borrowers who did not receive proper 
disclosure past the initial three-day period.32 Section 1635(f) capped 
this time horizon at three-years.33 Congress passed sub-section (f) 
because it was concerned with the risk of clouded title in cases where 
borrowers rescinded after selling their residence.34 
The recent financial crisis has thrust the TILA pendulum back in 
favor of consumers.35 With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),36 which 
 
 28.  See 114 CONG. REC. 14,388 (1968) (“I want to emphasize that the rights given to the 
buyer or borrower under the conference substitute have real teeth. When the debtor gives 
notice of intention to rescind, that voids the mortgage absolutely and unconditionally.”) 
(remarks of Rep. Sullivan). 
 29.  See discussion infra Part II.B (explaining mechanics of rescission); see, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1635(b). 
 30.  For a deeper discussion of other amendments that affect the right of rescission, see 
Francesco Ferrantelli, Jr., Truth in Lending? The Survival of A Borrower's Statutory Claim for 
Rescission, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 695, 701–05 (2014). 
 31.  Fair Credit Billing Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, title IV, § 405, 88 Stat. 1500 (1974). 
 32.  119 CONG. REC. 4596, 4597 (1983). 
 33.  15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(f). 
 34.  119 CONG. REC. 4596, 4597 (1983); Hefferman v. Bitton, 882 F.2d 379, 384 (9th Cir. 
1989). 
 35.  Scholars such as now-Senator Elizabeth Warren warned that, before the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) took over authority, consumer protection took a back-seat 
to banking industry objectives. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1, 90 (2008) (“The problem is deep and systematic. These agencies are designed 
with a primary mission to protect the safety and soundness of the banking system. This means 
protecting banks’ profitability. Consumer protection is, at best, a lesser priority . . . .”). 
Congress’s concern that consumers were not adequately protected does carry force: before the 
CFPB took over authority, the lending industry had been pushing the Federal Reserve Board 
(FRB) to not only restrict the right of rescission, but also to eliminate the right altogether. 
Edward H. Wilson III, Column Student Gallery, How CFPB Should Rule Regarding Whether 
Right to Rescission Should Be Removed from TILA, 2011 AM. BANKR. INST. J., 52, 52. In 
response, the FRB proposed to drastically limit the right by requiring the consumer to tender 
principal before the creditor terminates its security interest. 75 Fed. Reg. 58,539, 58,547 
(proposed Sept. 24, 2010). The issue was eventually punted to the CFPB, which refused to alter 
the rule, keeping § 1635(b)’s consumer-leaning process intact. 2012 Truth in Lending Act 
(Regulation Z), 76 Fed. Reg. 79,768, 79,996 (Interim Final Rule Dec. 22, 2011) (“Any security 
interest giving rise to the right of rescission becomes void when the consumer exercises the right 
of rescission.”). 
 36.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
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drastically reformed the financial system, Congress launched the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to “protect families 
from unfair, deceptive, and abusive financial practices.”37 President 
Obama stated that the CFPB was “a new consumer watchdog with 
just one job: looking out for people—not big banks, not lenders . . . as 
they interact with the financial system.”38 Dodd-Frank gave the CFPB 
exclusive authority over TILA enforcement. Before the passage of the 
CFPB, consumer protection was divided among seven different 
agencies.39 Congress found this process ineffective and streamlined 
consumer protection through the CFPB.40 
B.  The What, When, and How of § 1635: Rescission as It Stands 
Today 
There are many transactions that fall within the province of TILA 
but do not create the right of rescission.41 First, the right only applies 
to a security interest securing the consumer’s principle dwelling; 
vacation homes or second homes are exempt.42 Second, the loan must 
primarily serve a personal, not commercial, purpose.43 Third, the right 
of rescission does not apply to a residential mortgage transaction.44 
Finally, a mortgage refinancing with the same lender is exempt, while 
refinancing with another creditor bank is not.45 
1.  When Rescission May Be Exercised 
Section 1635 gives consumers the right to rescind a loan until 
midnight of the third business day following (1) consummation 
(closing) of the transaction, (2) delivery of the required relevant 
 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 37.  Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Creating the Consumer Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/creatingthebureau/ (last visited Oct. 27, 
2014). 
 38.  President Barack H. Obama, Remarks by the President at Signing of Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-
act. 
 39.  S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 10 (2010) (“The current system is also too fragmented to be 
effective. There are seven different federal regulators involved in consumer rule writing or 
enforcement.”). 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 1603 (West 2014) (listing exemptions). 
 42.  15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(a) (West 2014). 
 43.  Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(c) (2013); 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(12). 
 44.  12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(24); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(e). 
 45.  See, e.g., Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 724 (8th Cir. 2013) (arising out of 
refinancing); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(e)(1)(B). 
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rescission forms, and (3) delivery of the material TILA disclosures, 
whichever is later.46 Section 1635(a) therefore automatically enables a 
borrower to unconditionally rescind his loan during the three-day 
period.47 However, if a creditor does not deliver the material 
disclosures and inform the consumer of his right to rescind, the right 
extends beyond the three-day period.48 Section 1635(f) limits the 
borrower’s time horizon for exercising rescission even if the creditor 
did not deliver the required disclosures, providing that the consumer’s 
right “shall expire three years after the date of consummation of the 
transaction.”49 
2.  The Effect of Rescission 
When a consumer chooses to exercise his right of rescission, § 
1635(b) governs the unwinding process.50 First, the consumer sends 
the creditor notice of rescission, which immediately voids the 
creditor’s security interest.51 Second, the creditor has twenty days after 
receipt of the notice to return any consideration and take any action 
necessary to reflect the termination of the security interest.52 If the 
creditor does not return the property within twenty days, it forfeits 
the principle.53 Finally, only after the creditor has done his part is the 
consumer required to return any property.54 If the consumer has spent 
the loan money, he must tender “reasonable value.”55 If the lender 
does not respond, the consumer can sue to enforce rescission and 
recover costs and attorney’s fees.56 
3.  How Rescission is Triggered 
Both borrowers and lenders agree that TILA enables a borrower 
to rescind a loan under the right circumstances. The controversy lies in 
what steps must be taken by the borrower within the three-year 
period in order to exercise that right.57 A look at the relevant 
 
 46.  15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(a). 
 47.  Id. This unconditional three-day right is termed by courts and scholars as the “buyer’s 
remorse” provision. See, e.g., Hefferman v. Bitton, 882 F.2d 379, 383 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 48.  Id.  
 49.  15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(f); Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 413 (1998). 
 50.  Id. § 1635(b). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(3) (2013). 
 56.  15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(a)(3). 
 57.  Compare Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 276 (4th Cir. 2012) 
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statutory text overwhelmingly indicates that consumers rescind by 
“notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the Bureau, 
of his intention to do so.”58 In turn, Regulation Z allows consumers to 
notify the creditor through “mail, telegram or other means of written 
communication.”59 
C.  Beach’s Effect on the Current Circuit Split 
If the text of § 1635 is unambiguous, then why did the majority of 
circuits require suit instead of written notification? Much of the 
confusion is rooted in the Supreme Court’s decision in Beach v. 
Ocwen Federal Bank.60 In Beach, the Court found that § 1635(f) 
completely extinguishes a consumer’s right to exercise rescission once 
the three-year period ends.61 
1.  Majority Approach: Notice Is Not Enough 
The leading case highlighting the majority approach is the Tenth 
Circuit’s Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank.62 Like Beach, Rosenfield arose 
from a mortgage refinancing.63 Unlike Beach, the borrower exercised 
rescission within the three-year period by notifying the lender.64 The 
borrower received no response and stopped making payments.65 The 
lender, at this point another bank, initiated foreclosure proceedings 
against the borrower, who was procedurally barred from making the 
 
(requiring notice only), with McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1326 
(9th Cir. 2012) (requiring suit). 
 58.  15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(a).  
 59.  Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.23. 
 60.  Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank, 523 U.S. 410 (1998). In Beach, the consumer-borrowers 
refinanced their home, but stopped making payments on the loan five years after the 
consummation of the transaction. Id. at 413. The Beaches alleged that they did not receive 
required disclosures under TILA and contended that, notwithstanding § 1635(f), they should be 
able to raise the right of rescission as an affirmative defense. Id. The Court rejected this 
argument. Id. 
 61.  In often cited and sweeping language, the Court stated that 
[Section] 1635(f) says nothing in terms of bringing an action but instead provides that 
the right of rescission shall expire at the end of the time period. It talks not of a suit’s 
commencement but of a right’s duration, which it addresses in terms so 
straightforward as to render any limitation on the time for seeking a remedy 
superfluous. 
Id. at 417 (internal quotations omitted). This made sense because Congress could reasonably 
have believed that an indefinite right to rescission as a defense in recoupment could cloud a 
bank’s title on foreclosure. Id. at 418–19.  
 62.  Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, 681 F.3d 1172, 1172 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 63.  Id. at 1175. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
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rescission defense.66 The borrower then filed a separate declaratory 
suit seeking to rescind the loan.67 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected the borrower’s contention 
that written notice was all that is required to exercise rescission.68 It 
did so on two grounds. First, it found that Beach was “dispositive” of 
the question—notice alone is not enough to preserve a court’s ability 
to recognize a rescission after the three-year period.69 According to 
the Court, § 1635(f) is a statute of repose that completely extinguishes 
the borrower’s right after three years.70 The basis for the justification 
was Beach,71 though that opinion never described TILA as a statute of 
repose. Thus, TILA established a right of action that is redressable 
only when the party seeks recognition of it through the courts.72 
Second, the Court discharged the borrower’s claims based on 
contract law and the equitable nature of rescission.73 It noted that 
common law rescission is designed to return parties to status quo ante 
and that rescission under TILA is “analogous[ ] in substance.”74 The 
Court explained that the rescission remedy is not available “where its 
application would lead to prohibitively difficult (or impossible) 
enforcement” and that rescission should not be available for 
Rosenfield.75 
The court was particularly concerned with the potential for 
clouded title that may occur if the borrower exercised rescission but 
waited an undetermined time before filing suit, during which the loan 
could have been sold to another bank, thus impeding Congress’s 
commercial certainty concerns.76 Finally, the court stated that the plain 
meaning of § 1635 requires written notice, but that written notice 




 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. at 1178. 
 69.  Id. at 1182. 
 70.  Id.  
 71.  Id. at 1172. 
 72.  Id. at 1183. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 1184. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 1185. 
 77.  Id. 
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The Jesinoski’s home circuit has also taken the more restrictive 
approach to rescission. The Eight Circuit, in Keiran v. Home Capital, 
parroted the Tenth Circuit’s approach and reasoning almost to a tee.78 
Kieran is substantively analogous to Jesinoski. In Kieran, the 
borrowers showed that they were not given material disclosures by 
their lenders.79 The borrowers sent notice, but like the Jesinoski’s 
bank, the lender did not respond to the rescission notice until after 
the three-year period.80 The borrowers sued for declaratory relief to 
enforce the rescission.81 
The court engaged in a reading of § 1635 similar to that of the 
Tenth Circuit in Rosenfield and found that § 1635(f) acted as a statute 
of repose that completely barred rescission after the three-year 
period.82 Furthermore, it reiterated the clouded title concerns 
highlighted in Rosenfield and explained that remedial economy 
(returning parties to status quo ante) would not be furthered if 
written notice were enough to rescind.83 
2.  Minority Approach: Written Notice Is Enough 
The Third Circuit’s decision in Sherzer v. Homestar Mortgage 
Services demonstrates the minority, written-notice-only approach.84 In 
Sherzer, the borrowers obtained two loans—one for $171,000 and 
another for $705,000—from lender Homestar, which eventually 
assigned the loans to HSBC.85 Within the three-year period, the 
Sherzers sent notice to both lenders of their rescission because 
Homestar did not provide required disclosures.86 HSBC agreed to 
rescind the smaller loan, but refused to accept rescission for the larger 
loan.87 The borrowers sued to enforce the rescission.88 
 
 
 78.  See Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Given these 
considerations, we agree with the Tenth Circuit’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion in 
Rosenfield and hold that a plaintiff seeking rescission must file suit, as opposed to merely giving 
the bank notice, within three years in order to preserve that right pursuant to § 1635(f).”). 
 79.  Id. at 725. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 728. 
 83.  Id. at 727–28. 
 84.  Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 85.  Id. at 256. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
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The court looked to the plain meaning of the statute and 
explained that § 1635 clearly requires only written notice.89 Beginning 
with § 1635(a) and Regulation Z, the court explained that the text of 
both referred to notice as the exclusive mechanism for exercising 
rescission.90 Section 1635(b), which governs the unwinding process 
post-rescission, also suggests that “rescission occurs automatically” 
upon notice.91 Further support could be derived from § 1635(f), which 
is silent as to the judicial system.92 
The Sherzer court distinguished Beach, finding that it answers 
when rescission can be triggered, but not how to exercise it.93 
Furthermore, it explained that the lenders would not be subject to 
clouded title because a notice of rescission enables them to decide 
whether to unwind the transaction or file suit.94 
III.  HOLDING 
The Eighth Circuit swiftly rejected the Jesinoski’s written-notice 
approach, explaining that its precedent requires suit in order to 
rescind.95 However, two separate concurrences emphasized that this 
approach was incorrect and that written notice is sufficient.96 
IV. ARGUMENTS 
A.  Jesinoskis’ Arguments 
The Jesinoskis hinged their arguments on the plain meaning and 
purpose of § 1635 as well as congressional intent underlying the right 
of rescission.97 Their arguments follow the familiar pattern of statutory 
interpretation. First, the definition of “notify” suggests that written 
notice is sufficient.98 Second, the structure of § 1635 also confirms its 
 
 89.  Id. at 258. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 260. 
 93.  Id. at 262. 
 94.  Id. at 265. 
 95.  Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 729 F.3d 1092, 1093 (8th Cir. 2013. 
 96.  Id. at 1093 (Melloy, J., concurring); id. at 1094 (Colloton, J., concurring). 
 97.  See Brief for Petitioners, Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. No. 13-684 (U.S. 
Apr. 28, 2014). 
 98.  The Jesinoskis asserted that both traditional and legal dictionaries define the word 
“notify” to mean something less than filing a lawsuit; “notify” merely means to inform. Id. at 
16–18. In addition, TILA contains several other provisions, such as § 1638, § 1640, and § 1641, 
that also use the word “notify” yet do not require the filing of a lawsuit. Id. 
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plain meaning.99 Third, the legislative history further indicates that 
Congress sought to require written notice only.100 
The Jesinoskis focused on § 1640, TILA’s damages provision, and 
highlighted the differences between § 1635 and § 1640, suggesting that 
Congress sought to require suit in one but not the other.101 They 
further emphasized that the remedial purpose behind TILA suggests 
that Congress did not want to burden, but instead sought to protect, 
consumers.102 Next, the Jesinoskis explained that rescission by notice 
does not cloud title in the mortgage markets.103 The Jesinoskis also 
asserted that the CFPB’s opinion should be dispositive.104 Finally, they 
contended that § 1635(f) does not bar rescission by written notice.105 
All it does is require rescission to be exercised through the 
requirements of § 1635(a), which requires written notice.106 
 
 99.  Id. at 18. Section 1635(a) allowed borrowers to exercise both the three-day and the 
three-year rescissions using the same method of notification. Id. at 19. According to the 
Jesinoskis, requiring only notice during the three-day period but then requiring suit for the 
extended three-year period is “untenable” because the right of rescission is the same in both 
instances. Id. Furthermore, § 1635(b)’s lengthy and detailed unwinding process cannot operate 
if the Jesinoskis are required to file suit because its procedures are triggered upon “receipt of a 
notice of rescission.” Id. at 20. For example, § 1635(b)’s twenty-day return requirement would 
not work with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure responsive pleadings structure. Id. at 21.  
 100.  The right of rescission was amended numerous times, yet Congress never added to the 
rescission requirement. Id. at 25.  
 101.  Unlike § 1635, § 1640 creates a cause of action, establishes venue, and sets a statute of 
limitations, suggesting that Congress knows how to require litigation when it desires. Id. at 22.  
 102.  The Jesinoskis claimed that requiring notice only is consistent with remedial purpose 
behind the statute. Id. at 31. In passing § 1635, Congress also sought to codify common law 
rescission, which does not require rescission to be affected by suit, only notice. Id. at 31–32.  
 103.  The Jesinoskis reiterated that once the borrower exercises rescission, the lender has 
twenty days to decide whether there were any material non-disclosures. Id. at 33–34. If there 
were, the transaction unwinds as dictated by § 1635. If there were not, the lender can sue right 
away to determine that material disclosures were in fact made. Id. at 33–34. Thus, there will be 
no uncertainty in the transaction unless the lender itself creates it. Id. at 33–34. Moreover, even 
if there were valid policy concerns, it is not up to the courts to disregard the plain text of the 
statute in order to avoid practical problems created by a statute. Id. at 34. 
 104.  This is so because the CFPB is entitled to special deference and because neither the 
CFPB nor the FRB has ever changed the written notice requirement in Regulation Z since its 
inception. Id. at 35–37. This deference was affirmed when Congress passed authority from the 
FRB to the CFPB, which accepted the FRB’s written notice interpretation. Id. at 36–37.  
 105.  Because Beach is not dispositive, the Jesinoskis argued that the Court should borrow 
Minnesota’s relevant statute of limitations. Id. at 43–45. Here, the statute of limitations is six 
years, which means that the Jesinoskis did exercise rescission in time. Id. at 44–45. Furthermore, 
if the Court were to apply § 1640(e)’s statute of limitations, the Jesinoskis would also have 
validly exercised rescission because §1640’s one-year restriction also did not run. Id. at 45. 
 106.  Id. 
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B.  The Lenders’ Arguments 
The Lenders107 also began with the statutory text, asserting that 
under § 1635(a) there is a distinction between intent to rescind and 
actual rescission—the latter requires suit.108 Further, contrary to the 
Jesinoski’s viewpoint, § 1635(a) does not address how and when 
rescission is effectuated.109 Instead, § 1635(b) and (g) govern the 
procedures for rescission, depending on whether the right is 
disputed.110 
Congress, by changing the process of common law rescission, 
purposefully sought to include the court system in the rescission 
process because under § 1635, rescission is not complete until the 
borrower does his part to return the parties to status quo ante.111 
Furthermore, the Lenders claimed that § 1635(f), as a statue of repose, 
completely eliminated the borrower’s right after three years.112 
Ignoring the clear wording of § 1635, Lenders contended, would sow 
uncertainty and lead to clouded title, thwarting congressional intent to 
clarify the limits to rescission.113 
Next, the Lenders addressed the Jesinoskis’ statute of limitation 
arguments and warned that applying either § 1640 or the “patchwork” 
of the fifty states’ statute of limitations would lead to problems and 
inconsistency.114 The Lenders also confronted the flood of litigation 
argument, explaining that requiring notice would result in more 
litigation because creditors would be forced to file suit to clear title.115 
Finally, no deference should be given to the CFPB because 
Regulation Z does not answer the issue before the Court.116 
 
 107.  Brief for Respondents, Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. No. 13-684 (U.S. 
Apr. 28, 2014). 
 108.  Intention to rescind requires notice only and occurs when the lender actually did 
violate TILA; actual rescission requires the borrower to sue when the lender disputes the 
rescission. Id. at 21–22. 
 109.  Id. at 23. 
 110.  Section 1635(b) governs when rescission is uncontested, while §1635(g) considers 
disputed exercises of rescission. Id. at 23. Here, the Lenders claim, because rescission is 
disputed, § 1635(g) should control, and that provision requires the court to grant an “award” of 
rescission, which automatically implicates the court system. Id. at 24. This view was expressly 
rejected by the Supreme Court in its decision in this case. Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 790, 792–93 (2015). 
 111.  Id. at 30–32.  
 112.  Id. at 32–34. 
 113.  Id. at 36–37. 
 114.  Id. at 37–38. 
 115.  Id. at 38–39. 
 116.  Id. at 43–45. 
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V.  ANALYSIS: § 1635 REQUIRES WRITTEN NOTICE, NOT SUIT 
The view that a lawsuit must be filed to exercise rescission is 
fundamentally flawed for numerous reasons. First, it contradicts the 
plain meaning of § 1635 and Regulation Z. Second, it discards 
Supreme Court precedent requiring heightened agency deference 
under TILA. Third, it ignores congressional intent to make rescission 
a non-judicial process. Finally, by placing the burden on the borrower, 
it disregards the remedial nature of TILA, which is aimed at 
protecting borrowers from predatory loan practices by creditors, not 
vice versa. 
A.  Plain as Day: The Text of § 1635 Simply Requires Written Notice, 
Nothing More 
The issue of how rescission is exercised begins and ends with the 
plain meaning of § 1635. The statute’s plain meaning is unavoidable: 
Borrowers exercise rescission through written notice, not by filing 
suit. The Supreme Court has stated that the starting point for every 
case interpreting the construction of a statute is the language itself.117 
In this case, the statute coherently requires written notice because § 
1635(a) requires a borrower to exercise rescission by “notifying” the 
lender according to the regulations of the CFPB.118 Neither § 1635(a) 
nor Regulation Z requires borrowers to take any action in court; both 
refer exclusively to written notice as the sole mechanism for exercising 
rescission.119 
In its entirety, § 1635 is unambiguously silent as to the judicial 
system. None of the subsections dealing with the right of rescission 
make any mention of a lawsuit. In Beach, the Supreme Court 
explicitly observed that § 1635(f) “says nothing in terms of bringing 
an action.”120 Conversely, both statutes of limitation and statutes of 
repose usually refer either to causes of action or the commencement 
of a lawsuit when circumscribing the time period for initiating suit.121 
Put differently, when Congress desires to make commencement of a 
lawsuit necessary to exercise a statutory right, it does so explicitly.122 
 
 117.  Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265 (1981). 
 118.  15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(a) (West 2014). 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 417 (1998). 
 121.  Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 122.  See Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 732–33 (8th Cir. 2013) (Murphy, J., 
dissenting) (highlighting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Section 413 of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act as examples of statutes of repose that explicitly require suit).  
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TILA itself is brimming with provisions, such as § 1640, that expressly 
require suit; § 1635 lacks the same direction.123 
Only two provisions in § 1635 mention a court and neither address 
the issue of whether court involvement is necessary to exercise 
rescission.124 Thus, nothing in the text of § 1635 supports the 
proposition that a borrower seeking rescission must file suit, as 
opposed to merely giving notice.125 Requiring anything more than 
written notice would affix additional burdens that Congress did not 
intend to hoist upon borrowers.126 
Additionally, the idea that the three-year right to rescission can 
only be exercised by filing suit is inconsistent with the way the 
absolute three-day right is treated in the statute. If a borrower who 
received all material disclosures does not exercise rescission after 
three days, his right is forever extinguished; he cannot demand 
rescission the following day. However, if a borrower does exercise his 
right within the three-day period, the creditor must, “[w]ithin 20 days 
after receipt of a notice of rescission” return any money or property 
that it received from the borrower.127 Most importantly, after sending 
written notice within the three-day period, the borrower may file 
suit—even after the three-day period, in which he had an absolute 
right, has ended. There is no textual basis for treating the three-year 
right of rescission differently.128 Thus, the three-year right of rescission 
operates in the same way as the three-day right: the borrower’s right 
expires after three years, but if he properly rescinds through written 
notice, he can file suit after the three-year period has passed. 
B.  The CFPB’s Interpretation of § 1635 Should Be Dispositive 
If § 1635 is construed as ambiguous regarding rescission after the 
initial three-day “buyer’s remorse” period, the CFPB’s reasonable 
opinion should be dispositive. The CFPB is empowered with express 
authority over TILA and receives “heightened” deference from the 
 
 123.  15 U.S.C.A. § 1640. 
 124.  See Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 260 (finding that § 1635(b) and § 1635(g) mention courts but 
“shed no light” on what borrowers must do to exercise rescission). 
 125.  Keiran, 720 F.3d at 728. 
 126.  See Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 261 (finding that anything more than notice would graft 
“additional, unwritten requirements with which [borrowers] must comply”). 
 127.  15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(b) (emphasis added).  
 128.  See Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 264 (concluding that the three-day and three-year rights 
should function in the same manner); see also Keiran, 720 F.3d at 733 (Murphy, J., dissenting) 
(agreeing with Sherzer). 
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judicial system.129 This expansive power did not just fall from the sky. 
In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, the Court explained that 
transactions falling under the auspice of TILA were complex, highly 
technical, and variable.130 “Expansive” authority was given to 
implement and interpret the legal framework provided by TILA: 
“[D]eference [to the CFPB] is especially appropriate in the process of 
interpreting the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z. Unless 
demonstrably irrational, [CFPB] staff opinions construing the Act or 
Regulation should be dispositive . . . .”131 
On paper and in the courtroom, the CFPB has vigorously 
championed its position that written notice is all that is needed to 
rescind.132 Yet the majority of courts have completely ignored clear 
congressional intent and Supreme Court precedent mandating agency 
deference to the CFPB where the statute is silent or ambiguous.133 
Section 1635(a) supplies the relevant text, expressly requiring that a 
consumer “notify” the creditor of rescission.134 To the extent that § 
1635(f) is construed to require its own definition of how rescission is 
given, the CFPB is responsible for filling the gap left by Congress.135 
C.  Congress Intended to Make Rescission a Private, Non-Judicial 
Process Worked Out Between Borrower and Creditor 
In addition to finding no textual support, the proposition that suit 
is required disregards congressional intent to make rescission non-
judicial. TILA has existed for over four decades.136 During that time-
period, Congress has changed and reformed TILA in many ways.137 
Yet, over those forty years, Congress never changed the written notice 
requirement in § 1635(a). Most recently, with the passage of Dodd-
Frank, Congress had an ideal opportunity to eliminate or restrict 
 
 129.  Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980). 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  See, e.g., Brief of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal at 3, Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 
255 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 11-4254) (urging the court to find that written notice is enough to 
exercise rescission); see also 2012 Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z) 76 Fed. Reg. 79768, 
79803 (Interim Final Rule Dec. 22, 2011). 
 133.  See, e.g., Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 2013) (disagreeing 
with CFPB). 
 134.  15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(a) (West 2014). 
 135.  Ford, 444 U.S. at 565. 
 136.  See discussion supra Part II.A (highlighting origins of TILA). 
 137.  See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act Amendments of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-29, 109 Stat. 271 
(1995). 
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rescission under TILA. But Congress chose another path, transferring 
authority to an administrative agency whose sole focus was to protect 
consumers. This clear signal affirms congressional commitment to 
preserving rescission in its present form. Consequently, given TILA’s 
consumer-oriented focus, requiring borrowers to file suit would 
hinder the very class of people whom Congress sought to protect and 
would substantially frustrate the purpose of TILA. 
The legislative history also makes clear that Congress intended for 
rescission to be resolved privately between borrower and creditor. For 
example, in expanding from ten to twenty days the time that a 
creditor must refund a borrower’s money after he exercises rescission, 
Congress intended to give creditors more time to evaluate whether 
the right of rescission is available to the borrower and “whether it was 
properly exercised.”138 By placing the burden of initial investigation to 
make sure that rescission was properly exercised upon the creditor 
and not the borrower, Congress expressed clear intention for 
rescission to occur without suit. 
D.  TILA Was Enacted to Protect Consumers from Predatory 
Creditors, Not Vice Versa 
At its core, TILA is a consumer-oriented statute—courts have 
expressly held that it should be construed liberally in favor of the 
consumer, not the creditor.139 By empowering the borrower with the 
right of rescission, Congress intended to achieve a specific, 
overarching goal: protect borrowers, especially the poor, from 
predatory creditor practices.140 And the threat of predatory lending 
remains salient today. Congress reaffirmed its concern with the 
passage of Dodd-Frank, which amended TILA and sought to 
eradicate “unsound lending practices, including predatory lending 
tactics” on the part of lenders.141 
McOmie-Gray v. Bank of America142 is an ideal example of 
Congress’s justified apprehension. In that case, the borrower did not 
receive an important disclosure from the bank—the date at which her 
 
 138.  S. REP. NO. 96-368 at 29 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 264 (bold in 
original). 
 139.  Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1179–80 (10th Cir. 2012).  
 140.  See 114 CONG. REC. 14,388 supra note 28 (reiterating that TILA was created to protect 
consumers from predatory lending). 
 141.  S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 43 (2010). 
 142.  McOmie-Gray v. Bank of America, 667 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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right to cancel would expire.143 Two years later, the borrower sent a 
letter rescinding the loan.144 The lender refused to accept rescission.145 
Instead, it stonewalled the borrower until the three-year rescission 
right expired.146 Under the Lender’s view, a bank would be 
encouraged to delay a borrower from filing suit to evade 
responsibility for purposefully or negligently failing to make 
disclosures—disclosures that would have enabled the borrower to 
better assess his financial position. Such a result cannot possibly be 
what Congress intended when it empowered borrowers with 
rescission. 
E.  Rescission by Written Notice Will Not Cloud Title of Mortgages 
Despite TILA’s remedial purpose, some appellate circuits 
reasoned that because rescission is an equitable remedy designed to 
return the parties to status quo ante, allowing a borrower to rescind 
without suit would cloud the creditor’s title to the property and would 
thus disregard Congress’s “commercial-certainty concerns.”147 
However, this argument assumes too much because clouded title lasts 
only as long as the creditor desires. After receiving written notice, the 
ball is in the creditor’s court. Instead of waiting for the borrower to 
file suit, the creditor can verify whether the disclosures were valid and 
choose to negotiate or file suit to clear title. Thus, the creditor will 
never find itself subject to an uncertain clouded title without its own 
acquiescence.148 
Even if rescission by written notice does in fact cloud title, as the 
Lenders claimed, the Court lacks the right to simply discard the text 
of § 1635.149 The Court has repeatedly affirmed the principle that 
unintended consequences of a statute are Congress’s responsibility to 
fix, not the Court’s.150 Consequently, the current majority approach to 
rescission is ultra vires. 
 
 
 143.  Id. at 1326. 
 144.  Id. at 1327. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 1326. 
 147.  Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1187 (10th Cir. 2012); see also Keiran 
v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 728–29 (8th Cir. 2013) (agreeing with Rosenfield).  
 148.  Keiran, 720 F.3d at 734 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 149.  Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917). 
 150.  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998); Lewis v. City of 
Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 215 (2010). 
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F.  Beach Apprises When Rescission Can Be Raised, Not How to Raise 
It 
The circuit courts requiring suit based their decisions on Beach.151 
However, their reliance on Beach is misplaced because Beach clarifies 
when a borrower may exercise his right to rescind, but does not 
address how he may do so. Beach concerned borrowers who 
attempted to rescind a loan but failed to provide notice of rescission 
to the creditor within the three-year period required by § 1635(f).152 
The Beaches never sent written notice to the bank nor did they file 
suit; they simply stopped making payments.153 Only after the creditor 
initiated foreclosure proceedings did they attempt to use rescission as 
an affirmative defense.154 
Beach is not dispositive for several reasons. First, its facts are 
substantially different. The Jesinoskis, unlike the borrowers in Beach, 
timely exercised rescission through written notice within the three-
year period, subsequently filed suit, and did not raise rescission as an 
affirmative defense. In other words, Beach does not address the issue 
presented in this case. Under Beach a borrower must exercise his right 
of rescission within three years of the commencement of the loan or 
else his right is extinguished once the three-year period has passed.155 
The Lenders as well as the majority of Circuits are correct that Beach 
made clear that § 1635 is a statute of repose that serves as an absolute 
barrier to “bringing suit” after the three-year period passes.156 But 
Congress never required suit in the first place—rescission is worked 
out between the borrower and his lender outside of court.157 As the 
Supreme Court highlighted, Beach clarifies when a borrower can 
rescind but does not address the vital issue presented here: whether 
written notice is enough to exercise the right to rescission.158 
 
 151.  See McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1328 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(concluding that Beach is dispositive but making clear that “[w]ere we writing on a blank slate, 
we might consider whether notification within three years of the transaction could extend the 
time limit imposed by § 1635(f)”); see also Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1182 
(10th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e believe that Beach is dispositive of the instant question.”).  
 152.  Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 413 (1998). 
 153.  Id. at 413–14.  
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. at 419.  
 156.  Id. at 417. 
 157.  Belini v. Washington Mut. Bank, FA, 412 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 158.  Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 790, 792 (2015). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court could have rejected the Lenders’ arguments 
on numerous grounds; the legislative history, regulatory 
interpretation, and public policy considerations all weighed in favor of 
requiring mere notice to rescind. Yet, the Supreme Court did not 
inquire into any of these justifications. It declined to do so because, at 
the end of the day, this conflict is about a more fundamental 
principle—the plain meaning of a congressional statute. And the 
Court correctly read §1635 to mean what it says: rescission is 
exercised when the borrower provides written notice of rescission to 
the creditor. 
 
